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This paper studies the relation between average growth and growth volatility. To do so a two period
model is built which focuses on how ﬁrms choose their debt portfolio maturity. Due to imperfect enforce-
ability problems, we show that contracts ﬁnancing long term investments are biased towards short-term
debt. This can generate maturity mismatches between assets and liabilities and lead to liquidity crises.
Then it is shown that the relation between average growth and growth volatility is more likely to be neg-
ative in developing countries while it is more likely to be positive in developed economies. We therefore
invalidate the idea that volatility is the price for rapid growth in emerging market countries. This frame-
work also allows us to assess the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) and ﬁnancial opening (FO).
We show that FDI has stabilizing eﬀects in developing economies while FO has destabilizing eﬀects. On
the contrary in developed economies FO has stabilizing eﬀects.
1. Introduction.
After the last ﬁnancial crises, many voices rose to explain that these crises were new compared to the pre-
ceding ones (Radelet and Sachs [1998]). Indeed the usual concerns and features known to trigger crises
(governments unsustainable economic policies such as large ﬁscal deﬁcits or unrealistic exchange rate (Krug-
man [1979])) were absent or could not by themselves imply so severe crises (Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini
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2002 Summer Meetings, T2M-Evry, Venice University 2002 Summer School. Usual disclaimers apply.[1999] and Baig and Goldfajn [2002]). Several new explanations have then been brought to the fore front.
Two of them have particularly emerged from the debate. According to the ﬁrst one, ”crony capitalism”
can help explain recent economic crises (Krugman [1998]). ”Crony capitalism” has played a major role in
encouraging ﬁrms to take ineﬃcient decisions (over investment, excessive risks, etc... ). In other words,
it has distorted individual incentives. An illustration of this phenomenon has been the large and possibly
excessive levels of short term debt ﬁrms have accumulated. Implicit insurance prompted agents to believe
that they could beneﬁt from good draws and that someone else (the government) would pay the bill in case
of failure or bad draws.
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The second explanation refers to the ”Original Sin” hypothesis (Eichengreen and Haussman [1999]).
A c c o r d i n gt oi t ,a g e n t sﬁnancial positions such as those described in the preceding table are due to ﬁrms
inability to choose their ﬁnancial portfolios, ﬁrms having no available ﬁnancial strategy but the risky ones.
Although they know ex ante the risks associated with this type of ﬁnancial instruments, they are somewhat
constrained to adopt these ”dangerous” ﬁnancing strategies because this is the only way to get capital from
ﬁnancial markets.
Although both of these explanations may be reasonable and explain the vulnerability of a number of
countries to ﬁnancial crashes, they are still full of gaps and remain fairly ad-hoc in their foundations. The
crony capitalism explanation does not say where the implicit insurance scheme or the collusion links between
ﬁrms managers and politicians come from. They are simply taken as given. There is no positive theory of
crony capitalism. In the case of the ”Original Sin” explanation, we need to explain why this theory can be
relevant for some economies (developing countries) while other countries (developed countries) do not seem
to suﬀer from any ”Original Sin” problem. The eﬀects of the ”Original Sin” problem seem to disappear along
the development process. For instance, the proportion of short term debt in corporate debt portfolios seems
to decrease with the level of income per capita in the economy (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic [1999]).
Insert ﬁgure 1
2We need to understand how capital accumulation modiﬁes contractual relations between agents to un-
derstand the nature of the ”Original Sin” problem in developing countries. For these reasons, we try in this
paper to use a formal and explicit framework which helps explain why private agents do use risky ﬁnancial
strategies and why and how the riskiness of optimal ﬁnancial strategies evolves with capital accumulation.
1.1. The mechanism of the model.
To answer these questions, we build a model of a decentralized economy and focus on how ﬁrms determine
the maturity of their debt portfolios. The mechanism is the following. When contracts are imperfectly
enforceable, lenders impose on the debt portfolio of borrowers investing in long term activities a bias towards
short term debt because entrepreneurs are not able to commit ex ante with full credibility to invest in an
illiquid technology with exclusively long term liabilities. From the lender point of view, the problem with
long term debt lies in the freedom it leaves to the borrower. In a long term debt contract, there is at least one
date between the contracting date and the payment date. Therefore the borrower can do whatever he wants
at the interim date even though the lender is not pleased with that decision. In the model, the borrower
can decide to liquidate his project interim though liquidation is worse-oﬀ strictly speaking. With a capital
market this drawback is oﬀset with default: the borrower incurs a loss in the project pay-oﬀ but beneﬁts
from defaulting on long term loans. Therefore long term debt is not an appropriate instrument to ﬁnance
long term projects basically because it leaves ”too much” freedom to the borrower. Lenders can restrict this
freedom by modifying the composition of ﬁrms debt portfolios. When debt portfolios contain enough short
term debt, lenders have an eﬀective monitoring power: an interim liquidation can be observed and can be
sanctioned as the lender can ask for short term debt repayments. With a suﬃciently large proportion of
short term debt, liquidation becomes welfare decreasing and borrowers do not default nor on short nor on
long term loans. Short term debt has a monitoring power because it gives the possibility to lenders to inﬂict
welfare costs to borrowers which prevents the latter from liquidating.
However although this mechanism solves a micro incentive problem, it generates a global coordination
issue: When borrowers rely too much on short term debt, there can be multiple equilibria. If borrowers
3have large amounts of short term debts, lenders can refuse to roll-over these debts not because they fear
that the borrower is liquidating his project but because they fear that other lenders are doing the same.
Since the ﬁnal return depends positively on the amount of capital still invested interim, this amounts to an
increasing returns to scale technology which creates a strategic complementarity between lenders as to their
roll-over decision. Although, with the right contracts, borrowers have no incentives to liquidate, they can
be forced to do so because of a coordination problem giving rise to ineﬃcient liquidations. The trade-oﬀ
on which borrowers choose the composition of their debt portfolios is then quite simple. On the one hand
if they borrow proportionally more short term debt, the probability that they are confronted to ineﬃcient
liquidation increases. This reduces expected proﬁts. On the other hand, a relative increase in the proportion
of short term debt enables borrowers to borrow more capital. This increases expected proﬁts. Borrowers
choose a low or a high proportion of short term debt depending upon the relative strength of these two
eﬀects.
1.2. The macroeconomic results.
To derive the macroeconomic consequences of the last mechanism, we focus on the ratio of lenders to
borrowers wealth. This ratio has a negative impact on the probability that a run happens but also on
the eﬃciency of the economy since borrowers have access by deﬁnition to the most eﬃcient technologies.
Combining these two eﬀects, it is shown that average growth and growth volatility are negatively (resp.
positively) related in economies where this ratio is low (resp. high). Identifying the former case to that of
developing economies and the latter to that of developed economies1, the model therefore predicts that an
increase in average growth is compatible with a decrease (resp. increase) in growth volatility in developing
(resp. developed) countries. Moreover we provide empirical evidence which conﬁrms this result. Secondly the
model shows that opening the economy to FDI (resp. to ﬁnancial inﬂows) increases (resp. decreases) average
growth and decreases (resp. increases) growth volatility in developing countries. Opening the economy to
FDI (resp. to ﬁnancial ﬂows) has a negative (resp. positive) impact on the probability that a run on short
1Following data from Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine [1999], there is a positive correlation between the development level
and the amount of ﬁnancial intermediaries assets to GDP which is a proxy for the ratio of lenders to borrowers wealth.
4term debt occurs because, the relative capital stock of lenders increases (resp. decreases) which prompts
borrowers to take a larger (resp. smaller) proportion of short term debt in their portfolios. Schmukler and
Vesperoni [2001] show empirical evidence that ﬁnancial liberalization is usually followed by a reduction in
the maturity of ﬁnancial contracts.
1.3. Related literature.
Three types of literature are related to the issues studied in this paper. First, liquidity management and its
macroeconomic consequences have been studied in the seminal Diamond Dybvig [1983] paper. Panics can
happen in the banking sector when the maturity of bank deposits is shorter than that of bank loans due to
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. Banks can then act pools of liquidity to stop these panics. Diamond [1991]
is closer to our paper, ﬁrstly because it refers to non ﬁnancial ﬁrms and secondly because it studies how
ﬁnancial choices may help elevating informational asymmetries between lenders and borrowers. In Diamond
[1991] ﬁrms with good prospects are more likely to issue short term debt because their probability of being
confronted to liquidity shocks is smaller. Flannery [1986] and Kale and Noe [1990] also consider ﬁnancial
choices as signals on the quality of the projects ﬁnanced. Rajan [1992] broadens the analysis: he introduces
two additional elements, ex ante moral hazard, i.e. how the choices between short and long term debt
inﬂuences managers eﬀorts to get large returns and the possibility to choose between banking and market
ﬁnance, the diﬀerence lying in the informational advantage of banks on markets. The approach of our paper
is diﬀerent because it is the nature of long term projects (the possibility to liquidate interim) which prevents
ﬁrms from borrowing only with long term contracts. Here short term debt is not chosen by borrowers
but rather more imposed by lenders. A second strand of literature this paper is close to tries to explain
micro or macro stylized facts based on corporate ﬁnancial contracts. Albuquerque and Hopenhayn [2004]
study how optimal maturity debt contracts help explain the dynamics of ﬁrms development. Rodrik and
Velasco [1999] tries to explain why developing countries can rationally accumulate unsustainable amounts
of short term debt, the idea being that the long term debt market works with an increasing return to scale
technology. If projects are illiquid, then accumulating short term debt increases the prices of long term
5debt because the premium on long term debt depends positively on the amount of short term debt. This
paper is close. However short term debt is not necessarily welfare decreasing as is the case in Rodrik and
Velasco [1999]. Finally this paper is related to the literature dealing with the macroeconomic impact of
capital market imperfections (Bernanke and Gertler [1989], Greenwood and Jovanovic [1990], Acemoglu and
Zilibotti [1997], Kiyotaki and Moore [1997] or Aghion Banerjee and Piketty [1999]) in which a consensus
exists on the ideas that ﬁrst these imperfections generate or exacerbate cycles and ﬂuctuations and second
that these eﬀects seem to be more relevant for developing countries.
1.4. Road map of the paper.
The paper is organized as follows. The microeconomics of capital markets is established in the next section.
In section 3 we apply this micro framework to a macroeconomic model and derive how this model works
in its two period version in section 4. The main results are then established in section 5 and conclusion
eventually lies in section 6.
2. A two period credit market.
2.1. A capital market with imperfect enforceability.
When contracts are imperfectly enforceable, there exists a relation between the size of a debt portfolio and
the composition (between short term and long term loans) of this debt portfolio. To illustrate it, let us
consider:
• a risk neutral borrower-entrepreneur with initial wealth W is granted at date 0 a loan L from a pool
of risk neutral investors made a short term loan αL (which must be repaid after one period) and a
long term loan (1 − α)L (which must be repaid after two periods). The gross risk free interest rate on
short (resp. long) term debts is rs (resp. rl).
• The entrepreneur can invest in a technology (called production technology) with a marginal return 1
at date 1 and R at date 2 (R>r l).
6• Contracts are imperfectly enforceable, borrowers can default strategically on their debts. The marginal
cost of default is τ.
A borrower therefore pays for his short (resp. long) term debts if and only if his wealth at date t +1
(resp. t +2 ) is larger when he pays for his debts than when he defaults on his ﬁnancial contracts. Short
term debts are paid back if and only if W + L − αrsL ≥ (1 − τ)(W + L). Long term debts are paid back2
if and only if R(W + L − αrsL) − (1 − α)rlL ≥ (1 − τ)R(W + L − αrsL).
Proposition 1. Noting µ = L
W the debt equity ratio and α the proportion of short term debt, incentive












+ =m a x{y;0}.
Proof. Elementary algebra on the two incentive compatible constraints yields the proposition.
As is clear the right hand side of (2.1) can be a non monotonic function of α when rl > τRrs,i . e .i fτ is
suﬃciently small. We consider this case in what follows3.
2.2. A capital market with imperfect enforceability and interim moral hazard.
Interim moral hazard consists in the possibility for a borrower-entrepreneur to beneﬁt from liquidating his
project interim. Such an entrepreneur can claim ex ante to be willing to carry out his project till maturity.
But eﬀectively he liquidates his project interim which makes default on long term loans proﬁtable.
2.2.1. Incentives and contracts.
Let us consider the borrower-entrepreneur of the previous paragraph and let us add the following assumptions:
2We assume without loss of generality that a borrower who defaults on short term debts cannot carry out till the end the
project he has invested in initially.
3The condition rl > τRrs is a necessary condition to generate a trade-oﬀ between the quantity of capital an entrepreneur
can borrow and the maturity mismatch he accepts between his assets and his liabilities. The case rl ≤ τRrs is therefore
uninteresting because trivial.
7• At date 0, the entrepreneur can invest in the production technology (with a marginal return 1 at date
1 and R at date 2) or in a storage technology with a marginal return 1 at date 1 and r at date 2.
• At date 1, an entrepreneur who invested at date 0 in the production technology can turn to the storage
technology. The marginal cost of default for the production technology is τ and τ0 for the storage
technology.
• There is moral hazard at date 1: r<Rand (1 − τ0)r>(1 − τ)R.
Applying proposition 1, the incentive compatible contract for an entrepreneur who invests at date 0 in
the production technology but whose goal is to invest in the storage technology at date 1 writes as (α,µ)






whereas the incentive compatible contract for an
entrepreneur whose goal is to carry out his project in the production technology till date 2 writes as (α,µ) with






. As is clear under the assumption (1 − τ0)r>(1 − τ)R we
have µpro ≥ µliq. An entrepreneur who is oﬀered a contract µpro and who turns to the storage technology
at date 1 defaults on all his long term debts. Moreover the possibility to write contracts contingent on
the technology used cannot solve the issue since technological choices are made ex ante while moral hazard
materializes only interim. The following proposition summarizes the design of the contracts (α,µ) such that
an entrepreneur who claims that he will carry out till the end the production technology, will eﬀectively do
so.
Proposition 2. Under the assumptions of sections 2.1. and 2.2.1. and noting σ = R −(1 − τ0)r,i n c e n t i v e












Three remarks can be made. First, under the assumption of interim moral hazard µpro does not belong
to the set of incentive compatible contracts verifying (2.2). Interim moral hazard therefore reduces the
8borrowing capacity of entrepreneurs. Secondly, given the assumptions (1 − τ0)r>(1 − τ)R and rl > τRrs
we have rl − σrs > 0. Then an entrepreneur who wants to invest in the production technology and keep
t h es a m el e v e lo fd e b tµ will have to bear a higher proportion of short term debt compared to the situation
without interim moral hazard. There is therefore a ”bias” towards short term debt compared to the previous
situation. This is because short term debt appears as a monitoring device for lenders. They impose this bias
to make sure that borrowers do not take advantage of the presence of interim moral hazard.
Insert ﬁgure 2
Thirdly and ﬁnally, while long term debts can be defaulted on but it is not the case of short term loans.
The reason for this is that the interim pay-oﬀ is always the same whatever happens as concerns liquidation.
If the interim liquidation decision not only modiﬁed the ﬁnal return but also the interim one, default on
short term debts would be possible4.
2.2.2. Short term debts roll-over.
Let us ﬁnally consider the borrower-entrepreneur of the previous paragraph and add a ﬁnal assumption:
• Lenders can observe entrepreneurs decision interim (at date t+1) and then decide on that basis how
to behave as to short term debt repayment.
We have shown in the previous paragraph that the introduction of interim moral hazard generates a ”bias”
towards short term debt because for the same debt equity ratio µ, entrepreneurs have to rely relatively more
on short term contracts. Since liquidating a long term project is observable, lenders can decide to ask
for short term contracts repayments or accept short term contracts prorogation on a basis contingent to
the liquidation decision. If an entrepreneur decides to carry out till the end his project in the production
technology then it is incentive compatible for lenders to reduce the proportion of short term debt whereas if an
entrepreneur decides to liquidate his project then lenders have to ask for full repayments. Since entrepreneurs
4The assumptions we have considered are compatible with the intuition that long term contracts always embed more risks
than short term ones.
9can anticipate this type of behavior, no entrepreneur will try to liquidate his investment, basically because
such an option becomes worthless if lenders accept to prorogate some or all short term contracts when the
entrepreneur does not liquidate his project. The following proposition then gives the precise conditions on
how short term debt roll-over or short term debt prorogation is realized:
Proposition 3. Under the assumptions of sections 2.1. and 2.2., it is incentive compatible for lenders to










where rl,s the gross interest rate on rolled-over short term debts and rl the gross interest rate on long term
debts.
Proof. c.f. appendix.
We have therefore established three results in this part.
• The maturity structure of a debt portfolio has an inﬂuence on the size of this portfolio.
• When borrowers can deviate from the project they invest in initially, lenders bias debt portfolios
towards short-term debt.
• There is room for short term debt roll-over when short term debt repayments happen after the deviation
decision has been observed.
Let us now introduce this capital market framework in a macroeconomic model in order to shed some
light on the aggregate consequences of the structure of ﬁnancial contracts. In particular we determine how
borrowers choose their portfolios and the conditions under which short term debts are rolled-over or not.
103. Hypotheses and description of the model.
3.1. Agents and technologies.
We consider a single good economy with two types of risk neutral agents, entrepreneurs and workers. There
is a continuum of unit mass of each type of agent. All agents live for two periods and generations are non








. Consumption at time t +2is
represented by Ct+2 and Bt+2 is the bequest made at date t+2by an agent born at time t to his oﬀ-spring
born at time t +2and γ is a parameter (0 < γ < 1). All agents have access at any time to a storage
technology. This technology is liquid: cash ﬂows follow investments after one period. This technology uses
capital and produces capital, yt+1 = rkt with r>1.
Entrepreneurs have access to a production technology which uses capital and labor (supplied by workers)
to produce capital. The production function writes as yt+2 =( k∗
t)
ε (Atlt)






t =m i n{kt,k t+1}. This is an AK technology with two major diﬀerences. First the relevant capital stock
for output is the capital stock invested initially if and only if it is the capital stock still in the project at
date t +1 . This assumption captures the idea that entrepreneurs can extract capital from their project
at the interim date t +1to meet any possible need but such extractions are costly in the sense that they
reduce ﬁnal output. To extract capital entrepreneurs can use a liquidation technology. An entrepreneur who
liquidates k units of capital at date t +1gets k units of capital at date t +1 . The second major diﬀerence
lies in the illiquidity of the production technology. A project in which too much capital is liquidated interim
does not produce any output: A = A1[k∗
t ≥ (1 − η)kt] with A a strictly positive number and 1[x] is equal
to 1 if x is true and 0 otherwise. Entrepreneurs can liquidate interim at most a proportion η of the capital
stock initially invested without ”destroying” their projects. If they go beyond the proportion η, then the
remaining project is worthless: its total factor productivity is zero. The labor market being competitive, the
wage rate and the marginal return to capital when projects are carried out till maturity respectively write
as w =( 1− ε)Ak∗
t and R = εA.
In this economy there is a capital market similar to that of section 2 on which entrepreneurs can borrow
11from workers. There is imperfect enforceability, borrowers can default strategically. There are two types of
ﬁnancial contracts, a short and a long term debt contract. Defaulting on one’s contracts imposes to pay a cost
on ﬁnal output (τ for the production technology, τ0 for the storage technology). The production technology
is subject to interim moral hazard. It is more eﬃcient if entrepreneurs decide to pay for their debts but
it is less eﬃcient if entrepreneurs decide to default on their contracts: R>r 2 and (1 − τ)R<(1 − τ0)r.
This means that entrepreneurs would better liquidate their long term projects and invest in the storage
technology. The two available technologies are exclusive, entrepreneurs cannot not carry out at the same
time projects in both technologies. Agents types and technological choices are all observable.
3.2. Timing of the model.
At the beginning date (date t), agents make technological (liquid or illiquid technologies) and ﬁnancial (short
or long term debt) choices. At the interim date (date t +1 ), short term debts are partially or fully rolled-
over, illiquid projects may be liquidated. At the ﬁnal date (date t+2), the returns on the diﬀerent projects
are realized according to what happened at the previous date. Long term and rolled-over short term debts
are paid back, agents consume part of their end-of-life wealth and bequeath the other part to their unique
oﬀ-spring.
Insert ﬁgure 3
4. The two periods static model.
4.1. Optimal debt portfolios without interim moral hazard.
When there is no interim moral hazard between lenders and borrowers, then the ex ante observation of
technological choices enables lenders to write down the corresponding set of incentive compatible contracts.
In the case an entrepreneur chooses the production technology, then his expected proﬁtw r i t e sa s
Etπt+2 =[ ( 1+µ − αµrs)R − (1 − α)µrl]wt
12where wt is the initial wealth of the entrepreneur. His program consists in
max












Proposition 1. When there is no interim moral hazard, entrepreneurs choose assets and liabilities with
identical maturities.
Proof. With simple algebra, it can be shown that (4.1) is a always a decreasing function of α. Therefore
entrepreneurs choose the largest amount of capital they can borrow that is compatible with exclusively long
term liabilities. The optimal debt portfolio therefore does not contain short term debts, the optimal debt
equity ratio is µfb = τR
rl−τR and expected proﬁts are πfb =( 1− τ) Rrl
rl−τR.
4.2. Optimal debt portfolios with interim moral hazard.
Let us consider an entrepreneur whose initial wealth in normalized to one, who invests in the production
technology with a debt portfolio whose size is µ and contains αµ short term debts. Given the results of
sections 2.1.-2.2., such an entrepreneur can be confronted to two diﬀerent situations. Lenders can ask him
to pay for βµrs or αµrs as short term debt repayments with β ≤ α.
4.2.1. The safe ﬁnancing strategy.
When lenders ask the entrepreneur to pay for αµrs the entrepreneur is still able to carry out his project in
the production technology if and only if αµrs ≤ η(1 + µ). Then it is incentive compatible for lenders to ask
only for βµrs as short term debt repayments since the entrepreneur is always able to continue his long term
13project and has no incentive to deviate. The expected proﬁt of that entrepreneur5 then writes as
Etwt+2 =[ ( 1+µ − βµrs)R − (1 − β)µrl]wt
and his program consists in
P1 :
max














The solution to this problem (α1;µ1) is reached for µ1 = µfb and α1 = αsb = τR−σ
rl−σrs
rl
τR. However (α1,µ 1)







≥ τR − σ (4.2)
This inequality means that when the long term technology is not ”too illiquid” then entrepreneurs are able to
reach the ”no interim moral hazard” optimum. Put diﬀerently, when (4.2) is veriﬁed, there is no contradiction
between maximizing ﬁrms proﬁts and supplying incentives to forbid liquidations. In this case entrepreneurs
expected proﬁts write as π1 = πfb. On the contrary when (4.2) is not veriﬁed, the technological constraint
α1µ1rs ≤ η(1 + µ1) is binding and the optimal debt portfolio6 then writes as
α1 =
ηrl
ηrl +( 1− η)σrs
µ1 =
(1 − η)σ + η rl
rs
rl − (1 − η)σ − η rl
rs
5This expression is valid under the assumption that the market for short term debt roll-over is perfectly competitive. This
will be the case through out the paper. This assumption implies in particular that the interest rate on rolled-over short term
debt is identical to the interest rate on long term debt.
6To determine α1 and µ1 in this case, we need to solve for the system µ = µ(α,σ) and αµrs = η (1 + µ).
14As is clear, the case where (4.2) holds is not interesting since there is no trade-oﬀ between individual
incentives and ﬁrms proﬁts. If (4.2) holds entrepreneurs are able to reach their ”ﬁrst best” proﬁts πfb and
(α1,µ 1) is always the optimal debt portfolio. Therefore in what follows we suppose that (4.2) does not hold.
Entrepreneurs proﬁts7 then write as π1 =( 1+µ1)R − µ1rl.
4.2.2. The risky ﬁnancing strategy.
When lenders ask the entrepreneur to pay for αµrs then the entrepreneur is able to carry out his project in
the production technology if and only if αµrs ≤ η(1 + µ) while when lenders ask the entrepreneur to pay
only for βµrs then the entrepreneur is able to carry out his project in the production technology if and only
if βµrs ≤ η(1 + µ). Therefore when
µβrs ≤ (1 + µ)η < αµrs (4.3)
there are multiple equilibria: on the one hand the roll-over decision of lenders at the interim date determines
whether entrepreneurs are able or not to carry out their long term projects till maturity while on the other
hand the capacity of entrepreneurs to carry out their long term projects till maturity determines whether
lenders decide to roll-over their short term contracts or not.
Let us note p the probability that lenders decide to ask for full repayment of short term debts. This
means that lenders ask entrepreneurs with a probability p to pay for αµrs and with a probability 1 − p to
pay for βµrs. Then entrepreneurs’ expected proﬁtw r i t e sa s
Etwt+2 =[ ( 1− p)[(1+µ − βµrs)R − (1 − β)µrl]+p[(1 + µ − αµrs)r − (1 − α)µrl]]wt
7On can verify that when (4.2) holds, minβ (α1,µ 1)=0 . This means that all short term debts entrepreneurs contract are
rolled-over.
15Therefore the program8 of the entrepreneur writes as
P2 :
max











βµrs ≤ (1 + µ)η < αµrs
where Rp =( 1− p)R + pr. The solution then writes as µ2 = µfb and α2 = αsb.T h e r e f o r e ﬁrms optimal
expected proﬁts write as
π2 (p)=( 1+µ2)Rp − µ2rl
Let us note strategy i the solution to program Pi. Then we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2. When (4.2) holds, entrepreneurs always choose strategy 1. When (4.2) does not hold,





Proof. Comparing π1 and π2 yields the proposition.
When the production technology is suﬃciently illiquid, i.e. (4.2) is not veriﬁed, then entrepreneurs simply
take ﬁnancial decisions according to the risk of liquidation they anticipate. If an entrepreneur anticipates a
low probability of roll-over, i.e. a high probability that a run will occur, on his short term liabilities, then
he ﬁnances his investment with the maximum proportion of short term debt compatible with no run on his
short term liabilities. In the other case where the roll-over probability is high then entrepreneurs choose the
proportion of short term debt that guarantees a full roll-over in case of prorogation.
We now raise the question of how sustainable the situation of asset-liability maturity mismatch can be
in a macroeconomic framework. The following section tries to answer this question.
8In this case it is incentive compatible for entrepreneurs to pay for their long term debts even in the case where they are
compelled to liquidate their long term project. If we considered the case in which entrepreneurs pay for their long term debts if
and only if they are able to carry out till maturity their long term project then it can be easily shown that the latter situation
is always dominated by the former because the entrepreneur has to pay for default costs τ0r while there are no beneﬁts as to
the optimal debt portfolio (which size is still equal to µ2) or as to long term interest rates (which are priced at
rl
1−p since the
repayment probability is then equal to 1 − p).
164.3. Runs on short term debt and the equilibrium of the capital market.
To answer the question of whether the amount of short term debt accumulated in the economy is sustainable
or not, we deﬁne what is a run on short term liabilities and how lenders coordinate to run or not.
Deﬁnition 1. In a run on short term debt, lenders ask borrowers to pay for all short term debts whose
repayment may change projects returns. The ex ante probability that a run happens is the ratio of the
amount of short term debts subject to run to the amount of capital available for potential reﬁnancing.
This deﬁnition ﬁrst implies that lenders never run on projects ﬁnanced with debt portfolios (α1,µ 1).
Runs on short term debt are possible if and only if there are projects ﬁnanced with portfolios (α2,µ 2).
Secondly if we note we the entrepreneurs wealth, wl the lenders wealth, ν the proportion of entrepreneurs
w h op l a ys t r a t e g y2a n dδ = wl
we, then the amount of short term debts subject to run and the amount of
potential reﬁnancing respectively write as
νrs (α2 − β2)µ2we
r[δ − (1 − ν)µ1 (1 − β1) − νµ2 (1 − β2)]we
We still have to determine ν, i.e. the type of equilibrium (pure or mixed strategy) which appears. The
following proposition gives the precise conditions on the type of equilibrium which emerges.
Proposition 3. The equilibrium of the capital market always exists and is always unique. The probability
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if µ1 < δ ≤ µ2 +
α2µ2
q
{0;0} if δ ≤ µ1
Proof. c.f. appendix.
17There are three types of possible equilibria. First there can be a pure strategy equilibrium where all
entrepreneurs choose strategy 2 and the ex ante probability that a run happens is
α2µ2
δ−µ2. Second there can





of entrepreneurs choose strategy 2.
Then the probability that a run happens is q. Thirdly there can be a pure strategy equilibrium where all
entrepreneurs borrow δ per unit of own capital and the probability of a run on short term debt is zero.
5. Growth and macro-economic ﬂuctuations.
5.1. The theoretical framework.
The average growth rate of the economy and the standard deviation of the growth rate can be computed as
functions of the wealth distribution δ. Given the last proposition, the following expressions can be obtained.
Proposition 1. If δ >µ 1 the average gross growth rate of the economy gt and the variance of the gross





(1 + µ2)[p(δ)r +( 1− p(δ))A]+( δ − µ2)r2 − (µ2 − µ1)(1− ν (δ))
¡
r2 − r







(1 + µ2)(A − r)
¶2
If δ ≤ µ1 then Egt = A and var (gt)=0 .
Proof: c.f. annexes.
These expressions can be interpreted as follows. The expected growth rate is the sum of two terms:
(δ−µ2)r2+(1+µ2)(A−(A−r)p(δ))





is the growth loss induced by the mixed strategy equilibrium. This loss is due to the fact that the threshold
probability q is to low from a social point of view: a social planner who takes into account all the added value
of the project A and not only the capital share R would choose the risky ﬁnancing strategy for a larger short
term debt run probability. As to the growth rate variance it depends only upon the volatility of investments
made in the production technology and ﬁnanced with risky debt portfolios. At this stage, it is possible to
18study the variation of the expected growth rate Egt against the volatility of the growth rate var (gt).T o
these end we establish the following proposition.
Proposition 2. In the mixed strategy equilibrium, expected growth decreases with δ and growth volatility
increases with δ. In the pure strategy equilibrium case, expected growth increases with δ if and only if
δ <µ 2 + z1 and growth volatility increases with δ if and only if δ <µ 2 + z2.
Proof. c.f. appendix.
In the pure strategy equilibrium case, an increase in δ has two eﬀects. First it increases the proportion
of the macroeconomic capital stock invested in the liquid technology which decreases the expected growth
rate because the liquid technology has a lower return. Second an increase in δ reduces the probability that
a run on short term debt occurs because the reﬁnancing possibilities of lenders are larger and this increases
the expected growth rate. The proposition says that the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates for large values of δ while
the second eﬀect dominates for low values of δ. Growth volatility is also non monotonic w.r.t. δ because an
increase the probability that a run on short term debt happens can increase or decrease growth volatility.
In the mixed strategy equilibrium case, an increase in δ also has two eﬀects. First as previously it increases
the proportion of the macroeconomic capital stock invested in the liquid technology which decreases the
expected growth rate because the liquid technology is less eﬃcient. Second an increase in δ increases the
proportion of entrepreneurs who choose the risky ﬁnancial strategy which increases the expected growth
rate. However the ﬁrst eﬀect always dominates the second one. Growth volatility on the contrary is only
inﬂuenced by the second eﬀect. Therefore when δ is low (δ ≤ µ2 + α2
q µ2), the economy experiences mixed
strategies equilibria and the correlation between growth volatility and average growth is negative. On the
contrary when δ is large (δ ≥ µ2 +m a x{z1,z 2}), the economy experiences pure strategy equilibria and the
correlation between growth volatility and average growth is positive.
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195.2. Empirical evidence.
In order to test the validity of the growth volatility predictions of the model, we use data from two sources:
The Penn world tables and the World Bank ﬁnancial structure and economic development database. From
the ﬁrst source we get data on GDP. We use the GDP per capita in PPP as a measure of output per capita.
We compute the growth rate of this variable and the mean and the standard deviation of the GDP per capita
growth rate. From the ﬁnancial structure and economic development database, we measure δ (the ratio of the
ﬁnancial sector to the non ﬁnancial sector assets) with two proxies: the amount of liquid liabilities to GDP
or alternatively the sum of ﬁnancial intermediaries (central bank, deposit money banks and other ﬁnancial
institutions) assets to GDP. The model predicts that growth volatility is negatively related to average growth
in countries where the ﬁnancial sector assets are relatively small but positively related to growth in countries
where the ﬁnancial sector assets are relatively large. To test empirically this prediction, we estimate the
volatility of the GDP per capita growth rate as a function of the average GDP per capita growth rate, a
proxy for δ and an interaction term between these to last variables. To conﬁrm the model, we need that
the coeﬃcient of the average GDP per capita growth rate be negative while that of the interaction term be
positive. Finally in line with previous empirical volatility studies we introduce a ”catch-up” eﬀect through
the level of the GDP per capita growth rate which is meant to capture that more developed economies are
always less volatile. The econometric results follow.
Table 2. Dependent variable: standard deviation of GDP per capita growth.
Estimation 123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2
gi,t -0,25 -0,23 -0,38 -0,37 -0,11 -0,18 -0,24 -0,31 -0,00 -0,04 -0,04 -0,07
lli,t (×100) -0,42 -0,32 -0,43 -0,27 -0,11 -0,02
gi,t ∗ lli,t 0,44 0,39 0,28 0,33 0,10 0,11
logyi,t (×100) -0,31 -0,19 -0,16 -0,18 -0,06 -0,08
Adj. R-square 0,83 0,87 0,62 0,63 0,34 0,34 0,61 0,46 0,12 0,15 0,13 0,17
20Table 3. Dependent variable: standard deviation of GDP per capita growth.
Estimation 123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2
gi,t -0,45 -0,39 -0,64 -0,59 -0,27 -0,35 -0,30 -0,52 -0,02 -0,08 -0,08 -0,13
fiai,t (×100) -0,23 -0,32 -0,28 -0,22 -0,24 -0,18
gi,t ∗ fiai,t 0,40 0,35 0,16 0,24 0,05 0,08
logyi,t (×100) -0,31 -0,04 -0,27 -0,31 -0,12 -0,09
Adj. R-square 0,87 0,66 0,81 0,62 0,72 0,61 0,56 0,74 0,12 0,24 0,29 0,32
Note: In Table 2 and 3, estimations 1-4 contain individual and time eﬀects, estimations 5-8 contain ﬁxed eﬀects
only and estimations 9-12 contain time eﬀects only. In table 2, the sample includes 71 countries, 4 periods and
261 observations. In table 3, the sample includes 39 countries 4 periods and 136 observations. Both samples are
unbalanced. Each time period covers 10 years from 1961 to 2000 on which the mean and standard deviation of the
GDP per capita growth rate are computed. All equations have been estimated with an intercept and under the
assumption of heteroscedastic residuals. The GDP per capita growth rate during the relevant period in country i
is gi,t. The amount of liquid liabilities to GDP is lli,t,t h er a t i oo fﬁn a n c i a li n t e r m e d i a r i e sa s s e t st oG D Pi sfiai,t
and yi,t is the level of GDP per capita in PPP. Begining of period values have been considered for these last three
variables. Rows on which a (×100) has been added after the variable name indicates that the coeﬃcient reported
is one hundred times the estimated parameter in the regression. All reported coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 1%
level apart from those in small characters which are not signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The adjusted R square reported
is weighted.
These estimations give us four results. First the simple correlation between the size of ﬁnancial inter-
mediaries (measured by ll or fia) and volatility is always negative. Second the correlation between the
development level (measured by the log of GDP per capita) and volatility is also always negative. Thirdly
the simple correlation between growth and volatility is also always negative. Finally the interaction term
b e t w e e ng r o w t ha n dﬁnancial intermediaries assets always has a positive inﬂuence on volatility. Therefore
the econometric results conﬁrm the predictions of the model as to the growth volatility relationship: it is
negative in economies where ﬁnancial intermediaries have a low level of assets relatively to the rest of the
21economy while it is positive in economies where ﬁnancial intermediaries have a high level of assets relatively
to the rest of the economy. These estimations also show that an increase in ﬁnancial intermediaries assets
relatively to the rest of the economy reduces volatility, every thing else equal, if and only if average growth
is suﬃciently low. In other words in economies with large average growth rates, ﬁnancial development is
likely to increase growth volatility.
5.3. Foreign Direct Investment and ﬁnancial capital ﬂows.
Since growth volatility and average growth are functions of the ratio of lenders to borrowers wealths δ =
wl/we. any economic policy which modiﬁes this ratio inﬂuences growth and ﬂuctuations. For example foreign
direct investments inﬂows have a positive eﬀect on δ while ﬁnancial capital inﬂo w sh a v ean e g a t i v ee ﬀect on
δ. Given the results we obtained in the last proposition, FDI has a stabilizing role, i.e. decreases volatility, in
economies where the amount of ﬁnancial intermediaries assets is small relatively to the rest of the economy.
Aghion, Bachetta and Banerjee [1998] obtain a somewhat similar result. On the contrary ﬁnancial capital
inﬂows have a destabilizing role in those economies. This is because an increase in the relative size of the
ﬁnancial sector prompts ﬁrms to borrow relatively more in short maturities. This increases the diﬀerence
between assets and liabilities maturity and increases the growth volatility. Schmukler and Vesperoni [2003]
identify this mechanism empirically. They show that ﬁnancial liberalization contributes, every thing else
equal, to shortening the average maturity of ﬁrms debts.
Insert ﬁgure 5
6. Conclusion.
In this paper we have shown that macroeconomic ﬂuctuations in the form of liquidity crises can emerge
endogenously when ﬁnancial contracts are imperfectly enforceable. Imperfect enforceability creates a bias
towards short term debt because lenders use this ﬁnancial instrument to overcome the possibility borrowers
have to default strategically. However this bias generates maturity mismatches between assets and liabilities
which can lead to global liquidity crises when projects are illiquid. Based on this microeconomic mechanism,
22we have obtained some theoretical results as concerns the correlation between growth volatility and average
growth showing that it is positive in economies where lenders are relatively well-endowed but negative in
economies where are relatively ill-endowed. Moreover some empirical evidence has been brought which seems
to conﬁrm this view. This gives a new insight to the growth volatility debate showing that neither polar
conception is likely to be coherent with the data.
7. Appendix.
7.1. Tables and ﬁgures.
Pakistan Thailand Argentina Korea Mexico India Brazil Malaysia S. Afri.
D-E ratio 0,999 0,915 0,328 2,485 0,342 0,546 0,934 0,114 0,079
C. ratio 0,993 1,143 1,195 1,078 1,303 1,438 1,275 1,296 1,441
Q. ratio 0,51 0,697 0,747 0,773 0,89 0,904 0,911 0,913 0,937
Hong Kong Philippines Venezuela China Peru Colombia Taiwan Sri Lanka U.S.A.
D-E ratio 0,42 0,239 0,411 0,553 0,1 0,467 0,195 0,277 0,16
Cr a t i o 1,352 1,37 1,559 1,321 2,396 1,684 1,587 1,555 2,097
Qr a t i o 0,947 0,961 0,964 0,968 0,975 0,979 1,037 1,087 1,385
Table 1 : Aggregate ﬁnancial indicators (median) for non ﬁnancial ﬁrms9.
9Source : Claessens, Djankov et Nenova [2000]. D-E ratio refers to the debt equity ratio which is the ratio of total debt to
the market value of the ﬁrm. C. ratio refers to the current ratio which represents the ratio between assets and liabilities with
a maturity below one year. Q. ratio refers to the quick ratio is the ratio of current assets less inventories to current liabilities.
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Figure 3 : Timing of the model.
10Source : Claessens, Djankov and Lang [1998] and Penn World Tables 6.1. Each point represent a the median debt portfolio
for non ﬁnancial ﬁrms in a given country. The income per capita in 1988 in PPP is on the x-axis and the median proportion






Figure 4: Growth Mean Volatility Diagram11.
Figure 5: Financial Liberalization, debt and maturity. Source: Schmukler and Vesperoni [2003]
7.2. Incentive compatible contracts.
Let us consider a contract (α,µ). This contract must be such that entrepreneurs are better-oﬀ when they
pay for their long term debts than when they default. When an entrepreneur decides to pay for his long
11Arrows indicate the eﬀect of a positive change in δ on average growth and growth volatility.
25term debts, he carries out his project in the production technology till maturity and his ﬁnal proﬁti se q u a l
to
πpro =( 1+µ − αµrs)R − (1 − α)µrl
On the contrary if he decides to default then he turns to the storage technology interim and his ﬁnal proﬁt
is equal to
πliq =( 1+µ − αµrs)(1− τ0)r
Contracts which ensure that entrepreneurs pay for their long term liabilities need that πpro ≥ πliq which
simpliﬁes as µ ≤ σ
[(1−α)rl+αrsσ−σ]+ with σ = R − (1 − τ0)r. The incentive constraint which ensures that
entrepreneurs pay for their short term debt writes as µ ≤ τ









l + αrsσ − σ]
+
)
7.3. Incentive compatible short term debt roll-over.
Let us consider the case of an entrepreneur who carries out a project in the production technology with a
debt portfolio (α,µ). Then it is incentive compatible to exchange this portfolio against a portfolio (β,µ) if
and only if
R(W + L − βrsL) − (α − β)rl,sL − (1 − α)rlL ≥ (1 − τ)R((W + L) − βrsL)
If we note µ = L









26In this case the entrepreneurs debt portfolio (α,µ) becomes (β,µ).
7.4. Equilibrium of the capital market.
To determine the probability of a run on short term debt at the equilibrium, we need to write down the






(α1,µ 1) if p>q
(α2,µ 2) if p<q








Equilibria can then be identiﬁed with ﬁxed points of the function Γ(p). Since it is a non-increasing function
of p, there is at most one ﬁxed point an thereby one equilibrium. If
α2µ2
[δ−µ2]+ <qthen there is a unique
ﬁxed point for p =
α2µ2
δ−µ2. It is a pure strategy equilibrium where all entrepreneurs choose contracts (α2,µ 2)
(ν =1 ). This case is possible if and only if δ ≥ µ2+ α2
q µ2. On the contrary if
α2µ2
[δ−µ2]+ >qthen Γ has no ﬁxed
point and we look for mixed strategies equilibria. Given the deﬁnitions adopted as to how ﬁnancial contracts
determine the probability of a run on short term debts, a mixed strategies equilibrium is a proportion ν
which solves the equation q =
να2µ2
[δ−νµ2−(1−ν)µ1]+. Given that the right hand side is a continuous strictly










q µ2 + µ2 − µ1





µ2. Finally when δ ≤ µ1 entrepreneurs cannot
collectively borrow nor µ1 nor µ2. The economy is short of ﬁnancial capital. Then all entrepreneurs borrow
27δ per unit of own capital and the probability that a run occurs is zero.
7.5. Expected growth and growth variance expressions.
The gross growth rate of the economy writes as
gs =
ν (1 + µ2)weAs +( 1− ν)(1+µ1)weA +[ wl − νµ2we − (1 − ν)µ1we]r2
wl + we
where As = r with a probability p and As = A with a probability 1−p. This expression is valid if and only













and the growth rate variance is equal to





[ν (1 + µ2)(A − r)]
2
7.6. Volatility and expected growth variations.
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